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Allocation of Responsibility After
American Motorcycle Association v.
Superior Court
ERWIN E. ADLER*
In its landmark case of Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,1 the California
Supreme Court judicially adopted the doctrine of comparative
negligence in an action involving a plaintiff and a single defend-
ant. The court in Li specifically avoided making any decision con-
cerning the numerous issues which would be involved in a multi-
party action: the relationship of multiple defendants with one an-
other, the right of one defendant to join others for the purpose of
sharing payment of the judgment, the respective responsibilities
of such parties for the judgment (including those insolvent, par-
tially solvent or possessing an immunity), and the procedure for
the settlement of cases. In addition to resolving these important
substantive issues in the American Motorcycle2 decision, the
court adopted a philosophical ranking of values which will inevi-
* B.A. University of Michigan, 1963; J.D. Harvard University School of Law,
1966; L.L.M. University of Michigan, 1967. The author represented the Petitioner,
American Motorcycle Association in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court,
and the respondent in Safeway Stores Inc. v. Nest-Kart. Mr. Adler is a partner in
the Los Angeles firm of Lawler, Felix & Hall and is engaged in civil litigation.
1. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
2. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
tably effect and guide resolution of the numerous problems in the
context of comparative negligence which have not yet been liti-
gated.
Comparison of Li with American Motorcycle reveals a substan-
tial modification by the court of its previous articulation of judi-
cial philosophy and policy objectives.3 In Li, the California
Supreme Court adopted the basic philosophy that liability would
be determined in accordance with an allocation of fault; in the
court's words, the resulting judgment assured that "liability for
damage will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in di-
rect proportion to their respective fault."4 The court in Li also
adopted a philisophical bias against the moral absolutes involved
in identifying who was a "wrong" doer. Accordingly, the court re-
jected the "all or nothing" approach implicit in the doctrine of
contributory negligence which had previously acted as a complete
bar to recovery by a plaintiff only partially responsible for an inci-
dent. In doing so, the court indicated its reliance upon the "utili-
zation of special verdicts or jury interrogatories [which] can be of
invaluable assistance in assuring that the jury has approached its
sensitive and often complex task with proper standards and ap-
propriate reverence."5
In American Motorcycle, the fundamental premise of Li, that li-
ability follows an allocation of responsibility, was modified. In-
stead, allocation of responsibility (and ensuing liability) was
subordinated to a judicial solicitude for the recovery of damage
by injured plaintiffs. The court would not, it said, "work a serious
and unwarranted deleterious effect on the practical ability of neg-
ligently injured persons to receive adequate compensation for
their injuries."6 Its next priority was to establish a procedure
which would, in its view, encourage settlements. Only after hav-
ing satisfied these goals of establishing full recovery for the plain-
tiff and a settlement procedure did the court consider the
importance of imposing liability upon a tortfeasor in accordance
with the jury's determination of responsibility. Finally, a compar-
ison of the supreme court's decision with that of the court of ap-
peal indicates that a fourth policy objective, reducing the
transactional costs involved in implementing a system of compar-
3. The initial evaluation of the supreme court's decision as embodying a hier-
achy of values was made by Justice Thompson who presided at a seminar on com-
parative negligence at which the author also spoke. See Report of Seventeenth
Annual Seminar, Association of Southern California Defense Counsel pp. 117-21
(1978). Justice Thompson has refined this analysis in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. In-
ternational Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978).
4. 13 Cal. 3d at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
5. Id. at 824, 532 P.2d at 1240, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
6. 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
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ative negligence, carried little, if any, weight with the court.7
This article will first review the American Motorcycle decision
in terms of express and implicit holdings, its policy objectives,
and its impact upon the development of a new body of tort law.
Second, the paper will review the consequences, legal and practi-
cal, of utilizing the doctrine of joint and several liability in the
context of a comprehensive system of comparative responsibility.
Finally, we will review the potential problems arising in the con-
text of settling, in essence, a claim based upon a percentage allo-
cation for a fixed dollar amount.
I. IMPLEMENTATION OF A SYSTEM OF COMPARATIVE
RESPONSIBILITY-SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS
A. Allocation of Responsibility Among Defendants
The first and perhaps most easily recognized of the supreme
court's goals is found in that portion of the court's opinion dealing
with allocation of responsibility among multiple defendants. Here,
the court found no difficulty in requiring an allocation of liability
to be made upon the basis of each party's allocable responsibility
for an incident. The goal of achieving an equitable distribution of
responsibility could not, by hypothesis, conflict with any per-
ceived policy of favoring the plaintiff or affecting the ability to set-
tle his claim. Accordingly, the court implemented the goal of
allocating liability in proportion to fault.
In approving the use of such an allocation, the court was con-
fronted with the problem of resolving the potential conflict of two
related provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure.
While section 875(b) requires that principles of contribution
"shall be administered in accordance with the principles of eq-
uity,"8 the Legislature has also provided that only when one tort-
feasor has "discharged the joint judgment or has paid more than
his pro rata share," is he entitled to contribution. 9 As pointed out
by the petitioner, American Motorcycle Association, those princi-
ples are not necessarily in conflict.10 Assuming that the jury has,
7. Compare the decision and philosophy of the court of appeal in American
Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 135 Cal. Rptr 497 (1977)
with the Supreme Court decision in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court,
20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
8. CAI. CIV. PROC. CODE §875(b) (West Supp. 1978).
9. CAI. Crv. PRoc. CODE §875(c) (West Supp. 1978).
10. Supplemental Brief of American Motorcycle Ass'n at 33-34, American Mo-
by special verdict, allocated responsibility among various defend-
ants for an accident, it would be inequitable to refuse to enter
judgment based upon such an allocation of responsibility. That
has been the view taken by numerous other comparative negli-
gence states." Even prior to Li, one California appellate decision
had recognized that, historically, the contribution statute "incor-
porated the concept of apportionment measured by the compara-
tive fault of the several tortfeasors."12 Presumably because of the
historical bias of California courts against jury interrogatories and
special verdicts regarding allocating responsibility, discussed be-
low, the equitable apportionment provisions of the statute had
never been implemented in California.13
B. Joinder of Parties for Purpose of Allocation
The supreme court approved the filing of declaratory relief ac-
tions against parties alleged to be responsible in part for an inci-
dent for purposes of sharing the judgment. The basic theory
advanced was that of equitable indemnification. Previous cases
had permitted joinder only where the indemnitee (defendant)
sought total indemnity from the indemnitor (cross-defendant).
This "all or nothing" form of indemnification had been predicated
upon the following philosophy:
The difference between primary and secondary liability is not based on a
difference in degrees of negligence or on any doctrine of comparative
negligence-a doctrine which, indeed, is not recognized by the common
law;... It depends on a difference in the character or kind of the wrongs
which cause the injury and in the nature of the legal obligation owed by
each of the wrongdoers to the injured person .... But the important
point to be noted in all the cases is that secondary as distinguished from
primary liability rests upon a fault that is imputed or constructive only,
being based on some legal relation between the parties, or arising from
some positive rule of common or statutory law or because of a failure to
discover or correct a defect or remedy a dangerous condition caused by
torcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182
(1978).
11. See Lacewell v. Griffin, 214 Ark. 909, 219 S.W.2d 227 (1949); COLO. RULES OF
Crv. PRO. Rule 22 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. §52-104 (1958); Stuart v. Hertz Corp. 302
So.2d 187 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); IDAHO CODE §6-803(4) (Supp. 1978); KANSAS
STAT. ANN. §60-258(a) (1964); HAw. REV. STAT. §§663-17(a), 663-31 (Supp. 1975);
MASS. GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A-53A-1
to 2A-53A-5 (West 1952); Miss. CODE ANN. §85-5-5 (1972); NEv. REV. STAT. §§17.215-
17.325 (1973); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. §§1401-1403 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE §§32-
38-01 to 32-38-04 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. §§15-8-11 to 15-8-22 (1967); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, §2(b) (Vernon Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-
27-40 (1977); Wyo. STAT. §1.7.3(d) (Supp. 1975); Packard v. Whitten, 274 A.2d 169,
174 (Me. 1971). Contra, Howard v. Spafford, 132 Vt. 434, 321 A.2d 74 (1974).
12. Rollins v. State of California, 14 Cal. App. 3d 160, 165 n.8, 92 Cal. Rptr. 251,
254 n.8 (1971).
13. See text at notes 46-54 infra.
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the act of the one primarily responsible.
14
American Motorcycle Association contended that the fundamen-
tal rationale of such cases, that the common law does not recog-
nize degrees of fault, was eviscerated by Li. In American
Motorcycle the supreme court agreed and permitted joinder of
such cross-defendants for the purpose of making an allocable de-
termination, stating:
... California decisions have long invoked the equitable indemnity doc-
trine in numerous situations to permit a "passively" or "secondarily" neg-
ligent tortfeasor to shift his liability completely to a more directly culpable
party .... [Tihe rule has fallen short of its equitable heritage because,
like the discarded contributory negligence doctrine, it has worked in an
"all-or-nothing" fashion, imposing liability on the more culpable tortfeasor
only at the price of removing liability altogether from another responsible,
albeit less culpable, party.
... [W]e think that the long-recognized common law equitable indem-
nity doctrine should be modified to permit, in appropriate cases, a right of
partial indemnity, under which liability among multiple tortfeasors may
be apportioned on a comparative negligence basis.1 5
Such an allocation neither disturbs the plaintiffs ability to collect
a full judgment nor impairs, in the court's view, his ability to ob-
tain a settlement.
C. Active v. Passive Indemnification (Non-Contractual)
Based upon the court's approval of a system of equitable in-
demnification administered on a comparative basis, it is doubtful
that the active-passive indemnification doctrine remains viable.
Although the court has not yet addressed this matter, it did
specifically reject the primary-secondary distinction as a basis for
indemnification.16 Much like the approach rejected for indemnifi-
cation, the active-passive distinction justifies the shifting of the
entire burden of paying a money judgment from one who is "less"
responsible to one who is "more" responsible. The essential pred-
icate for liability of the "passive tortfeasor," however, is that he is
in some measure responsible for the injury. Nevertheless, on the
basis of an "all-or-nothing" doctrine, he may shift the entire bur-
den of paying the judgment to the indemnitor who is "actively"
responsible for the incident.
If the court's rejection of the primary-secondary distinction did
14. Ford Motor Co. v. Robert J. Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 694, 696-97, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 702, 704 (1971) (emphasis added), citing Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366
Pa. 322, 325-26, 77 A.3d 368, 370-71 (1951).
15. 20 Cal. 3d at 583, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
16. See text at notes 12 & 14 supra.
not foreshadow the demise of this doctrine, the court's heavy reli-
ance upon Dole v. Dow Chemical Company,17 a decision in which
New York rejected the doctrine,18 should forecast the end of its
application. The issue has not yet been directly addressed by any
appellate decision since American Motorcycle.
The fundamental postulate, that the "active" and the "passive"
tortfeasor are both responsible for the incident, was not discussed
in either of the only two post-Li appellate decisions to consider
such requests for indemnification.19 The practical difficulties of
applying this doctrine to concrete factual situations are as well
known as the inconsistencies in result.20 Similarly, the cases
outside of California are sparse and inconsistent on this issue.21
Should the doctrine be continued, it must be recognized that its
rationale is completely inconsistent with the basic philosophy of
imposing liability in accordance with fault.
D. Active v. Passive Indemnification (Contractual Provision)
Although the supreme court could have reviewed the doctrine
of active-passive contractual indemnification in a contract with
typically vague language, it did not discuss the issue in the first
such post-American Motorcycle decision before it.22 Rather, it ap-
17. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S. 2d 382 (1972).
18. Id. at 149-51, 282 N.E.2d at 292-93, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 388-89.
19. Compare Sanders v. Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry. Co., 65 Cal. App. 3d 630, 640-41,
654-55, 135 Cal. Rptr. 555, 560-61, 569-70 (1977) with Link-Belt Co. v. Star Iron &
Steel Co., 65 Cal. App. 3d 24, 30, 135 Cal. Rptr. 134, 137-38 (1976). The court in Link-
Belt refused to apply comparative apportionment of fault on the basis that indem-
nity is an all or nothing remedy. The court did not interpret Li as overruling prior
indemnity law. In Sanders the trial court apportioned the damages between de-
fendants on the basis of Li. The appellate court was receptive to the trial
court's approach but declined to apply Li since the trial court judgment was given
before the Li decision became effective.
20. A defendant can actively and affirmatively cause harm yet be only pas-
sively negligent; moreover, the determination of "active" may be a fortuitous re-
sult based upon the parties sued and their role in the litigation. Compare Ford
Motor Co. v. Poeschl, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 3d 694, 98 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1971) with Barth v.
B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 137, 92 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1971).
21. Compare Gies v. Nissen Corp., 57 Wis. 2d 371, 386-87, 204 N.W. 2d 519, 527
(1973) (rejecting active-passive indemnification) with Bjorklund v. Hantz, 296
Minn. 298, 302, 208 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1973) (approving active passive indemnifica-
tion).
22. Gonzales v. R. J. Novick Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 798, 675 P.2d 1190, 144 Cal. Rptr.
408, (1978). The clause reads:
SUB-CONTRACTOR FURTHER AGREES AS FOLLOWS: . .. 23. IN-
SURANCE-To indemnify and save Owner, Architect, and Contractor
harmless against all claims for damages to persons or to property growing
out of the execution of the work, and at his own expense to defend any
suit or action brought against Owner, Architect, or Contractor founded
upon the claim of such damage. To procure and maintain during the en-
tire progress of the work, full and unlimited Workmen's Compensation
and Employer's Liability Insurance, Public Liability and Property Damage
[Vol. 6: 1, 1978] Allocation of Responsibility
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plied the distinction so as to impose upon the employer-indemni-
tor the total amount of the judgment.
In its second decision dealing with written indemification, how-
ever, it touched upon the issue. The court held that to the extent
that indemnification is not compelled by the plain written lan-
guage of an agreement, the trial court should utilize the equitable
indemnification doctrine to allocate responsibility for an incident
between the indemnitor and the indemnitee. Following American
Motorcycle, the court held that where "the duty (of indemnifica-
tion] established by contract is by the terms and conditions of its
creation inapplicable to the particular factual settting before the
court, the equitable principles of implied indemnity may indeed
come into play."23 The court remanded for a determination in ac-
cordance with American Motorcycle.24 Since the contractual pro-
vision before it did not contemplate the adjudged active
negligence of the indemnitee, the court held the indemnitor could
obtain such indemnification. In doing so, the court thereby per-
mitted a contractual indemnitor to become a common law indem-
nitee.
Despite the court's application of the doctrine, there is little to
commend the retention of the active-passive distinction. Assum-
ing that the purported indemnitor and indemnitee are before the
court, there probably will be a determination of their respective
responsibilities for an incident. If such an allocation is made,
even the "passively" negligent tortfeasor will receive an allocation
of responsibility; for example, a failure to warn the plaintiff of a
risk may constitute negligence. Should he be determined to be
ten percent responsible for the incident, there appears to be no
policy justification for labeling him "passive" and allowing him to
exculpate himself of all responsibility for the incident. On the
contrary, since the tortfeasor has been found responsible, he
Insurance in limits and with a carrier or carriers satisfactory to Contrac-
tor; to furnish Contractor with certificates of said insurance before com-
mencing work hereunder, which shall provide that the policy shall not be
cancelled or reduced in coverage until ten (10) days after written notice
shall be given to Contractor of such cancellation or reduction in coverage.
To insure his interest from loss to the premises resulting from fire, earth
settlement, earthquake, theft, embezzlement, riot or any other cause
whatsoever, and neither the Owner nor the Contractor will, under any cir-
cumstances, be liable or accountable to the Sub-Contractor for such loss.
Id. at 807, 575 P.2d at 1195, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 413.
23. E.L. White, Inc. v. The City of Huntington Beach, 21 Cal. 3d 497, 508, 579
P.2d 505, 511-12, 146 Cal. Rptr. 614, 620-21 (1978).
24. Id. at 510, 579 P.2d at 513, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
should be barred from recovering that ten percent of the judg-
ment.
The use of the allocation procedure raises a question as to
whether the announced policy against indemnifying a person
against his own "active" negligence continues to make good
sense in the context of written agreements. The usual parties to
such an indemnification agreement are solvent defendants who
have, as part of the contract, allocated the cost and responsibility
of obtaining insurance. 25 While the insurance company issuing
the policy will determine whether or not contractual indemnifica-
tion exists, it will rarely review the specific language of the in-
demnity agreement.
There is little justification for continuing to eviscerate contrac-
tual language so that an indemnity governing "all claims," for ex-
ample, is interpreted to mean all claims except for those arising
out of active negligence. The result achieved by the courts in "in-
terpreting" contractual language appears to be directly contrary
to the language of the agreements and the common understand-
ing of the businessmen who negotiated them. The requirement of
"magic language" to achieve indemnification appears contrary to
the philosophy of such recent legislation as the Uniform Commer-
cial Code which was intended to simplify the drafting of commer-
cial agreements. It appears that, as a result of this practice, little
has been accomplished in terms of reaching some policy objec-
tive. Moreover, the court in American Motorcycle and Li rejected
the notion that any person involved in a tort has committed a rep-
rehensible "wrong." Rather, the court realistically concluded that
such persons are only wrongdoers in the sense that they have
committed a tort which requires compensation. To permit busi-
nessmen to allocate risks (and the payment of insurance) by con-
tract would appear to be consistent with that objective. In any
event, even if the contracts are not enforced so as to meet their
intended objective, the continued fiction of applying the active-
passive distinction should be abandoned in favor of allocation.
E. Vicarious Liability
The entire doctrine of respondeat superior rests upon the basis
that the master will be compelled to assume the entire liability
created by the agent; it would therefore appear that, under a doc-
trine of comparative negligence, there would similarly be no need
for allocation between the two parties. Under the contribution
statute, for example, the Legislature has indicated that the master
25. This is typical commercial practice. See, e.g., CAL COMM. CODE §2320
(West 1964).
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and the servant shall contribute a single pro rata share.26 That
also appears to be the rule in other jurisdictions, irrespective of
whether they have adopted comparative negligence. 27 In one re-
cent appellate decision, however, the court allocated the responsi-
bility between a principal and its agent on the basis of the
allocation principles of American Motorcycle. In substance, the
principal sought indemnity against the agent and the trial court
held that such an action should be tried on the basis of allocation
principles. In affirming the judgment, the court held that it was
proper to allow the jury to apportion the relative negligence of the
principal, an insurance company, and its agent which had led to
liability on the insurance policy. In doing so, the court indicated
that such a holding was consistent with the doctrine of implied
comparative indemnity adopted by the supreme court in Ameri-
can Motorcycle.28
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE-PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS
A. Allocation of Responsibility to Defendants
In Li, the supreme court concluded that comparative negli-
gence required a jury finding by interrogatory or special verdict in
order to allocate responsibility for an incident between a plaintiff
and a single defendant. In American Motorcyle, that logic was ex-
tended: "it is logically essential that the plaintiff's negligence be
weighed against the combined total of all other causative negli-
gence."29 The court indicated that the plaintiff may compare his
negligence against the class of all defendants, whether or not
served by the plaintiff. Conversely, the court did not articulate
any need for allocating the individual responsibilities of the vari-
ous defendants at the time of this comparison with the plaintiff.
There is, of 'course, no stated policy favoring the plaintiff's ability
to demand such an allocation between the defendants, as com-
pared with his right to do so against the class of all defendants.
No institutional justification permits the plaintiff to demand
that an allocation be made among the defendants at the time of
26. CAT_ CIV. PROC. CODE §876(b) (West Supp. 1978).
27. See Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 25 NJ. 17, 37, 134 A.2d 761, 771
(1957).
28. New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Sauer, 83 Cal. App. 3d 454, 460, 147 Cal. Rptr.
879, 882 (1978).
29. 20 Cal. 3d at 590 n.2, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
trial. Consistent with the practice generally prevailing in indem-
nity actions, issues having to do with indemnification and alloca-
tion may be delayed until the plaintiff has proven his case.
Should defendants be required to try their respective cases
against each other, evidence may be introduced which will be ex-
traneous to the plaintiff's case. If the plaintiff loses, numerous ad-
ditional days of trial time would have been consumed by the
courts and the attorneys in litigating matters having no bearing
on the ultimate outcome. Moreover, in some cases, the determi-
nation of such allocations will unnecessarily serve to confuse the
jury.
Some plaintiffs' attorneys have expressed a desire to require
the jury to make such an allocation between the defendants at the
same time that it makes an allocation between the plaintiff and
the class of defendants. That desire is apparently predicated
upon the tactical consideration that this allocation might cause a
disruption of a common defense between certain defendants.
This is, however, an insufficient justification for introducing addi-
tional time and issues into a lawsuit. Such a common defense
may involve defendants whose interests are similar in comparison
with those of the plaintiff. In a products liability action, for exam-
ple, a manufacturer of an allegedly defective product and a re-
tailer have a common interest in defeating a plaintiff's claim.
Similarly, a hospital and medical personnel using its facilities
may have a common interest in meeting a claim of medical mal-
practice.
Should the defendants desire such an allocation, a set of special
interrogatories or verdicts may be supplied to the jury after it has
determined the responsibility of the class of defendants for the
incident. The resolution of the indemnification problems in Amer-
ican Motorcycle is consistent with the typical pre-Li indemnity
case. Nothing herein, however, should be read as implying that,
in appropriate circumstances, the jury should not make an alloca-
tion of individual defendants' responsibility at the same time that
it determines the responsibility of the class of defendants. Con-
trol over trial procedure, as indicated by the court in American
Motorcycle, will remain subject to the discretion of the trial
court.
3 0
B. Necessity for Filing a Cross-Complaint to Obtain an
Allocation
Although the court approved allocation between defendants,
the language of the court's opinion did not discuss whether a
30. 20 Cal. 2d at 606-07, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200; CAL. CIrV. PROC.
CODE §1048 (West Supp. 1978).
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cross-complaint is required to obtain such an adjudication or
whether an affirmative defense requesting such allocation is suffi-
cient. In its petition, American Motorcycle Association only re-
quested the court to permit the filing of its cross-complaint to join
additional defendants. Nevertheless, there is nothing illogical
about permitting such an allocation to be predicated upon the
pleading of an affirmative defense by a party requesting such allo-
cation.
Upon this point, practice has differed in northern and southern
California. Analogizing to the affirmative defense which raised
the issue of the employer's negligence in Witt v. Jackson,31 many
attorneys in northern California have relied upon the pleading of
comparative contribution as an affirmative defense.32 On the
other hand, the more common practice in southern California ap-
pears to be that this issue is placed in controversy by a cross-
complaint. There is nothing in the language of the American
Motorcycle decision which compels either practice. As a strategic
consideration, it would probably be more helpful to raise the allo-
cation issue by way of cross-complaint thereby permitting the
pleader to define the issues he desires to be tried, particularly if
they differ from the plaintiff's theories.
C. Plaintiff as a Necessary Part to the Cross-Complaint
Assuming that a cross-complaint is filed, the plaintiff should be
joined as a cross-defendant. Otherwise, an adjudication of re-
sponsibility as to the cross-defendants would not be binding upon
him.33
D. Declaratory Relief as the Remedy
Claims for equitable indemnification must be predicated on the
basis of declaratory relief. As properly held in numerous deci-
sions prior to American Motorcycle, a request for contribution
31. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).
32. See, e.g., Tate v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. App. 2d 238, 28 Cal. Rptr. 548
(1963) (permitting employee's negligence issue to be raised by affirmative de-
fense).
33. See Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236-37, 132 Cal. Rptr.
843, 846 (1976). (The court refused to decide the issue "that each of several con-
tributing joint tortfeasors... is liable to the plaintiff in damages, but only in the
proportion that his negligence bears to the total negligence [i.e., that of all contrib-
uting joint tortfeasors and plaintiff] which proximately caused plaintiff's damages"
since the plaintiff was not made a party. Id.).
may not properly be made prior to judgment.34 On the other
hand, a request for declaratory relief permits all such claims to be
tried in one action and avoids the requirement of a pre-existing
judgment.3 5 Accordingly, a request for declaration of rights and
duties as between the parties is required so that, upon entry of
the judgment in favor of plaintiff, the court may simultaneously
enter its determinations as to the allocable responsibility of each
of the other parties for the incident.
E. Costs
The issue of who is to pay for costs after entry of judgment has
not yet been conclusively determined by the appellate courts. Al-
though it would appear that allocation principles, as between the
plaintiff and defendant, should require the allocation of such costs
on an equitable basis, at least one appellate court appears to have
reached a contrary result.3 6 Although the court in that decision
recognized that the policy underlying recovery of costs is unques-
tionably intertwined with consideration of fault, it concluded that
it was statutorily required to grant all such costs to the plaintiff
who was "the prevailing party" under section 1032 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. While determining that the plaintiff was forty
percent responsible for his own injury, the court focused upon the
jury's finding of "a verdict in favor of the plaintiff."
The absolute and unqualified allowance of costs is inconsistent
with the allocation principles mandated by Li. Even assuming
that the court's interpretation of section 1032 is correct, it is clear
that when there is a cross-complaint and the plaintiff is not found
free of all negligence, there is not one but two prevailing parties.
Even if one ignores the allocation principles in a case without a
cross-complaint, it is apparent that the decision is not applicable
to the situation where there are cross-complaints and the court
has been required to enter judgments on both the complaint and
cross-complaint.
F. Retroactivity
The court in American Motorcycle did not specifically indicate
34. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE §875(a) (West Supp. 1978) (Section 875(a) requires,
as the predicate for a contribution action, that there be "a money judgment
[which] has been rendered against two or more defendants in a tort action.").
35. The substantive pleading requirements are described in a number of tort
cases involving similar requests for declaratory relief. See Jefferson Incorporated
v. City of Torrance, 266 Cal. App. 2d 300, 302, 72 Cal. Rptr. 85, 86 (1968); Lewis Ave-
nue Parent Teachers' Assn. v. Hussey, 250 Cal. App. 2d 232, 235-36, 58 Cal. Rptr. 499,
501-02 (1967).
36. Hyatt v. Sierra Boat Co., 79 Cal. App. 3d 325, 145 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1978).
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whether the decision was to be retroactive and if so, whether in
whole or in part. Appellate decisions after American Motorcycle
have not been consistent.37
In Li, the court specifically indicated that "the present opinion
shall be applicable to all cases in which trial has not begun before
the date this decision becomes final in this court."3 8 In the re-
lated context of applying comparative negligence principles to
strict liability in tort, the court adopted a similar approach. 39
When the court was confronted with this issue in Safeway
Stores,40 a subsequent case with a similar situation in which the
trial court had ordered the jury to make such an allocation, it indi-
cated that a greater retroactivity should be granted. Thus the
court held that "when-as in the instance case-the issue of com-
parative contribution or indemnity has been properly preserved
below, no undue surprise or unfairness will result in applying the
American Motorcycle decision in cases presently pending upon
appeal."41 As noted by the court, substantial questions had been
raised after Li with regard to continued application of California
pro rata contribution rules. Numerous trial courts, moreover, had
exercised their discretion to direct the jury to prepare special ver-
dicts or jury interrogatories. Accordingly, there would be rela-
tively few cases which would require retrial on this issue.4 2
On the other hand, if a defendant had filed such a cross-com-
plaint initially and had been unsuccessful in doing so, the dismis-
sal of this cross-complaint would have been res judicata and
would have required application of California pro rata contribu-
tion rules. The cross-complainant would have had to appeal the
37. County of Ventura v. City of Camarillo, 80 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 1024, 144 Cal.
Rptr. 296, 299 (1978); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal.
App. 3d 492, 495 n.1, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262, 263 n.1 (1978); Lemos v. Eichel, 83 Cal. App.
3d 110, 119, 147 Cal. Rptr. 603, 607 (1978).
38. 13 Cal. 3d at 829, 532 P.2d at 1244, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
39. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 743-44, 575 P.2d 1162, 1173, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 391 (1978).
40. Safeway Stores v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550
(1978).
41. Id. at 333, 579 P.2d st 447, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
42. The issue of retroactivity in Safeway was not initially briefed by the par-
ties. By letter dated August 4, 1977, from the Clerk of the Supreme Court to the
parties, the court requested special argument on two points, one of which was: "If
the court should adopt a comparatve indemnity or comparative contribution doc-
trine, what, if any, retroactive effect should such a decision be given?" The other
issue concerned the incorporation of strict liability in tort into a system of compar-
ative negligence.
adverse and erroneous decision, since a second attempt to file
such a pleading would have been improper although there had
been a change in the law.43
III. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILrrY
The Supreme Court, in its treatment of joint and several liabil-
ity in American Motorcycle concluded that although the jury may
allocate responsibility as between defendants (and cross-defend-
ants), the court would retain the doctrine of joint and several lia-
bility for tort actions generally. The court held: "[A]fter Li, a
concurrent tortfeasor whose negligence is a proximate cause of an
indivisible injury remains liable for the total amount of the dam-
ages, diminished only 'in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering.' "44 With those words, the
supreme court attempted to resolve one of the most significant
and troubling issues underlying the law of tort: When is it justifia-
ble for one person to be called upon to pay money to another for
injury occurring to the latter? A concrete example may help to il-
lustrate the problem. Assume a drunken driver, bereft of assets
or insurance, drives his vehicle in excess of the speed limit and
hits a car going through an intersection. In such a situation, the
plaintiff or his heirs recover nothing as a practical matter. Should
the result change if the defendant drunk claims that a stop sign
was partially obscurred by the leaves of a neighboring tree and
the jury determines that these leaves proximately (two percent)
caused the accident? Should the result change if the plaintiff was
also drunk and traveling faster than the speed limit?
As illustrated above, in a multi-defendant action, various par-
ties, including the plaintiff, may have contributed to an injury. On
this issue, the court indicated that its primary concern was with
protecting the interest of the plaintiff by assuring him a total re-
covery rather than being concerned with the equity or fairness of
calling upon a defendant to pay for more than his allocable share
of responsibility for causing the incident.
A. Moral, Ethical and Social Considerations Underlying Joint
and Several Liability
In this final quarter of the twentieth century, it seems startling
to find that plaintiffs, as a class, have a greater claim upon the
court's sympathy than defendants. In contrast, the court in Li
had mandated that each person's allocable responsibility for an
43. Harland v. State of California, 75 Cal. App. 3d 475, 487-88, 142 Cal. Rtpr. 201,
209 (1977).
44. 20 Cal. 3d at 590, 578 P.2d at 906-07, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189-90.
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incident would be determined by the finder of fact, whether that
tortfeasor is labeled a "plaintiff" or a "defendant."
Participants in an accident contribute to its occurrence in vari-
ous ways. The consequences of their negligence intertwine.
Their moral blameworthiness as actors in the drama, however, is
not predicated upon their respective roles in subsequent litigation
as "plaintiffs" or "defendants." Irrespective of the amount of in-
jury, the first to sue becomes "the plaintiff." Those initially hailed
into the action are called "defendants." Frequently, a "defend-
ant" becomes a "plaintiff" by way of cross-complaint. The fact-
finding process by jury use of a special verdict or interrogatory to
allocate responsibility strips the judicial process to its founda-
tion-the transfer of money from one person caused by his
wrongdoing to pay for the loss he has caused another. Before
and after Li, a plaintiff injured by an insolvent defendant could
recover nothing regardless of the latter's blameworthiness. That
fundamental reality has not been changed by either Li or Ameri-
can Motorcycle. Similarly, the respective blameworthiness of two
(or more) defendants concurrently causing an accident is un-
changed by Li and American Motorcycle. The supreme court, in
simultaneously approving a joint and several verdict and the allo-
cation procedure, has indicated that it will predicate liability for a
defendant upon the solvency of his co-defendant, not upon blame-
worthiness.
That the judicial system could sanction such a result in certain
cases prior to Li was due to a lack of proper basic principles and
an inadequate procedure. Prior to Li, the courts would not allo-
cate responsibility between defendants; moreover, the doctrine of
contributory negligence cast a moral stone against the "guilty"
tortfeasor by the completely "innocent" plaintiff.45 Today there is
no such justification for laying the entire burden of an accident
caused by one tortfeasor labelled as "defendant," whether or not
served, upon another "defendant." Fairness dictates that the
blameworthiness of all actors in an incident be treated on a con-
sistent basis.
In attempting to shift the loss caused by one "defendant" onto
another "defendant," there must be some rationale justifying the
transfer. Labeling a party as a "plaintiff" rather than "defendant"
affords only illusory justification. Unfortunately, the general ef-
45. See text at notes 51-53 infra.
fect of permitting joint and several liability is to cast upon a mar-
ginal defendant who may be a local governmental agency or some
other target defendant, the burden of paying a judgment caused
by another.
Two recent trial court decisions illustrate the lack of an ethical
basis for applying a joint and several liability rule in a system of
comparative responsibility. In Holdsberg v. Schwab, Kabaz dba
Le Lycee Francais de Los Angeles,46 the jury found one defend-
ant to be ninety-eight percent responsible for the incident and the
other defendant two percent responsible. The plaintiff sought to
hold the marginal defendant for the entire judgment. Similarly, in
Spivey v. General Motors Corp.,47 the plaintiff was found one per-
cent negligent, General Motors found one percent negligent and
the plaintiff's employer found ninety-eight percent negligent.
Under the American Motorcycle rules, the marginal target defend-
ant, General Motors, was required to pay ninety-nine percent of
the judgment less the workman's compensation benefits.
Although the court has determined that assisting the plaintiff to
obtain a full judgment is of greater value than equitable alloca-
tion, it suggests no cogent reason why one class of litigants
should be favored over others. Had there been only one defend-
ant, though insolvent, the plaintiff would have recovered nothing.
By permitting an increase in the number of defendants (or liti-
gants) in the action, there is no increased justification for requir-
ing a marginal defendant to pay for more than his allocable share.
B. Precedential Underpinnings Rejected by the Court in
American Motorcycle
The court rejected established rules in California concerning
the basis for a several judgment in the context of tort actions.
These rules had been well settled for more than a half century. In
the landmark decision of California 0. Co. v. Riverside P. C. Co.,48
the court allocated responsibility to the defendant cement com-
pany for its portion of the dust generated by two competing ce-
ment producers. While the dust from both plants had caused
injury to plaintiff's orchard, the court held:
The California Portland Cement Company and defendant were not joint
tortfeasors. Their respective torts-wrongfully operating their respective
cement plants in such manner that deposits of cement dust, blown from
the plants toward plaintiffs orange grove, were incrusted upon the leaves
of plaintiff's trees-were several when committed, and did not become
joint merely because of a commingling of the dust from the respective
46. Los Angeles Superior Court No. WEC 26332.
47. Los Angeles Superior Court No. NWC 39967.
48. 50 Cal. App. 522, 195 P. 694 (1920).
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plants and a union of the consequences proceeding from the several and
independent tortious acts.
4 9
The court accordingly concluded that: "Defendant is liable only
for such proportion of the total damage resulting from the com-
mingled dust emitted into the atmosphere from the plants of the
two cement companies as was caused by its own plant."50 That
principle has been recognized for many years in personal injury
and property damage actions and has often compelled the entry
of a several judgment when an allocation was obtained.51 It has
also been recognized in numerous other jurisdictions. 52
49. Id. at 524, 195 P. at 695.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Connor v. Grosso, 41 Cal. 2d 229, 232, 259 P.2d 435, 437 (1953),
(property damage-nuisance allocated as to source); Duprey v. Shane, 39 Cal. 2d
781, 795, 249 P.2d 8, 16 (1952) (personal injury-medical malpractice allocable based
upon cause); Slater v. Pacific American Oil Co., 212 Cal. 648, 654, 300 P. 31, 33-34
(1931) (property damage-oil well residues-allocable by cause); Carolotto Ltd. v.
County of Ventura, 47 Cal. App. 3d 931, 936-37, 121 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174-75 (1975)
(property damage from flooding allocable as to cause); Griffith v. Kerrigan, 109
Cal. App. 2d 637, 639-40, 241 P.2d 296, 298 (1952) (sources of sewage causing prop-
erty damage allocable); DeCorsey v. Purex Corporation, 92 Cal. App. 2d 669, 676,
207 P.2d 616, 620 (1949) (personal injury damages allocable based upon cause of
injury); and Katenkamp v. Union Realty Co., 36 Cal. App. 2d 602, 618, 98 P.2d 239,
247 (1940) (portion of property damage allocated to defendant). All of these deci-
sions appear to be predicated upon the notion that a several judgment should be
entered once an allocation can be provided.
52. See, e.g., Higgenbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 773-74 (5th Cir.
1976). (If a rational basis exists for the apportionment of damages then the de-
fendants are not jointly liable. Ford Motor Co., through product design, may have
enhanced the injury but was not the proximate cause of the auto accident itself.
The court applied Georgia law); Key v. Armour Fertilizer Works 18 Ga. App. 472,
89 S.E. 593 (1916). (Two fertilizer plants owned by separate corporations contrib-
uted to nuisance caused by gas fumes. The court held that the corporations did
not act in concert and hence cannot be found to be jointly liable for the damages);
NEV. REV. STAT. §41.141(3) (1973):
3. Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant in such an
actioh [i.e. Tort];
(a) The defendants are severally liable to the plaintiff.
(b) Each defendant's liability shall be in proportion to his negligence
as determined by the jury, or judge if there is no jury. The jury or
judge shall apportion the recoverable damages among the defend-
ants in accordance with the negligence determined. Id.;
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §507:7-a (1977) (Comparative negligence); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12 §1036 (1973) (comparative negligence); Bermeister v. Youngstrom, 81 S.D. 578,
139 N.W.2d 226 (1965); Howard v. Spafford, 132 Vt. 434, 321 A.2d 74 (1974). (Defend-
ants are liable severally but not jointly, so each defendant is only liable for his
proportion of harm. The court interpreted defendant to mean the party actually
sued by the plaintiff. The court would not allow damages to be allocated to a non-
party defendant or to give contribution to the defendant from the non-party
defendant.); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Edwards, 512 S.W.2d 748, 751-52 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1974) (Where a joint judgment is properly entered, certain states will re-
Prior to the decision in Li, California trial procedure virtually
precluded a defendant from obtaining a measurement and an allo-
cation of his responsibility. If he could obtain such an allocation,
however, a several judgment would result.5 3 Some decisions de-
nied the tortfeasor an allocation because his proportional contri-
bution to the result could not be accurately measured; other
decisions held that degrees of negligence could not be mea-
sured.54 Such decisions, resting upon a legal fiction, were super-
seded by the approval of the supreme court in Li of special
verdicts and jury interrogatories measuring each party's allocable
responsibility for an incident.
Moreover, the courts disfavored the entry of several judgments
on the very basis condemned by the court in Li. That is, before
Li, only a morally blameless plaintiff could recover and "wrong-
doing" defendants could not complain if the jury was not permit-
ted to allocate responsibility. The allocation could not be made,
since courts would not "permit an innocent plaintiff to suffer as
against a wrongdoing defendant."55 Since Li, however, plaintiff
need not be "innocent" of all wrongdoing to recover damages.
With the implementation of a system of comparative negligence,
even a plaintiff who is "guilty" of wrongdoing (in the sense that
he has contributed to his own injury) may recover damages.
Under pre-Li cases "each person is held for the entire damages
unless segregation as to causation can be established."56 After Li
such a determination and segregation of causation is made daily
by juries throughout California by use of the special verdict and
jury interrogatory procedure.
The court's resolution of the problem in American Motorcycle
focused upon the fact that the jury had concluded that the tort-
fuse to require the defendant who has been less negligent than the plaintiff to be
burdened with the cost of the insolvent tortfeasors.) See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 2212a §2(e) (Vernon Supp. 1978) and OR. REV. STAT. §18.485 (1977). Min-
nesota has retained the traditional common law notion of limiting joint and sev-
eral liability to preclude impositon of such liability unless the defendants were
acting in concert. See Marier v. Memorial Rescue Service, Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 207
N.W.2d 706; moreover, the rule of joint and several liability is applied only when
the plaintiff is free from all negligence. (See Kowalske v. Armour and Co., 300
Minn. 301, 220 N.W.2d 268, (1974). A number of justices on the California Supreme
Court appeared interested in the Minnesota approach during argument in the
American Motorcycle and Nest-Kart cases; the language of the opinion indicates
the court ultimately rejected that concept.)
53. See cases cited note 51 supra. Those appear to be consistent with non-Cal-
ifornia authority. See note 52 supra.
54 See, e.g., Reilly v. California Street Cable Railroad Co., 76 Cal. App. 2d 620,
623, 173 P.2d 872, 874 (1946).
55. Finnegan v. Royal Realty Co., 35 Cal. 2d 409, 434, 218 P.2d 17, 32 (1950).
56. Id. at 433, 218 P.2d at 32.
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feasor's negligence was "a proximate cause" of the incident.5 7
The court's conclusion, however, that "a concurrent tortfeasor is
liable for the whole of an indivisible injury whenever his negli-
gence is a proximate cause of that injury"58 does not resolve the
problem. The very question before the court was whether, after
the jury has allocated responsibility for injury, such a divided in-
jury is "indivisible." Present day jury verdicts demonstrate that
such injury is divisible. Except for protecting the plaintiff, the
court articulated no basis for rejecting those cases which had held
that an injury capable of being divided was divisible and there-
fore, judgment should be entered on a several basis.
C. Socio-Economic Considerations
The court's decision indicated that "from a realistic stand-
point" 59 the rules governing allocation were subordinate to the
ability of a plaintiff to obtain full recovery for his injury. Neces-
sarily, the court also rejected the considerations raised by the
court of appeal that the transactional costs involved in continuing
to impose joint and several liability outweighed the continued
utility of that doctrine after allocation. As noted by the court of
appeal,6 0 among the social costs involved are an ingrained system
of contingent fees, claims administration costs, and expenses inci-
dent to the present system. These related expenses compel be-
tween two and three dollars in cost to be paid, and therefore
socialized, to cover one dollar of loss shifted from one individual
to another. The appellate court, in contrast to the decision of the
supreme court, found that the transactional costs incident to the
transfer of money from a defendant to a plaintiff were too great to
justify the continued retention of joint and several liability within
the comparative negligence context.
D. Constitutional Problems
In essence, the court's decision compels a person's liability for
the judgment to be predicated upon solvency rather than respon-
sibility for the incident. Accordingly, the imposition of such liabil-
57. 20 Cal. 3d at 586, 578 P.2d at 904, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
58. Id. at 588, 578 P.2d at 905, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
59. Id. at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
60. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 3d 694, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 497 (1977); See also the discussion in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International
Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 497, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262, 264-65 (1978).
ity is arguably in direct contravention of the equal protection
clause of the Constitutions of the United States and of the State
of California. As one case illustrating the point, the California
Supreme Court has rebuffed the attempts of the state to recover
the costs of institutionalizing a mother in a home for the mentally
ill from the estate of the daughter. In holding that the state could
not impose the payment of these costs on the daughter although
she was solvent, the court declared: "It is established in this state
that the mere presence of wealth or lack thereof in an individual
citizen cannot be the basis for valid class discrimination."61 Other
similar decisions indicate that the obligation of one party may not
constitutionally be made the responsibility of another.62
To require one defendant to pay the obligation of another may
also constitute a taking of property without due process of law.
Justice Brandeis stated this principle as follows: "[0] ne person's
property may not be taken for the benefit of another private per-
son without a justifying public purpose, even though compensa-
tion be paid."63 In California, that principle has been applied to
void legislation permitting one party to have control over the
property of another:. "Statutes which operate in a manner to give
one person power over the property of another have been de-
clared clearly arbitrary and a denial of due process, the police
power notwithstanding."64 The thrust of these constitutional
prohibitions is that there can be no valid justification for a taking
of the private property of one party to pay for the debt of an-
other.65
61. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirschner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 721, 388 P.2d
720, 723, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488, 491 (1964), cert. granted and vacated, 380 U.S. 194 (1964),
on remand, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).
62. Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206 (1931) (husband may not be com-
pelled to pay income taxes imposed upon the separate property of his wife); De-
partment of Mental Hygiene v. Bank of America, 3 Cal. App. 3d 949, 954, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 559, 563, (1970) (parent's estate may not be held liable for the expenses of
institutionalizing decedent's daughter, a mentally ill person).
63. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1936).
64. Paley v. Bank of America, 159 Cal. App. 2d 500, 511, 324 P.2d 35, 42 (1958)
(citations omitted).
65. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 430 (1934) (unconstitu-
tional to require a railroad to subsidize truck operators by building an underpass
at its expense not required by considerations of public safety); Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co. v. Choctaw Gas Co., 205 Okla. 255, 260-61, 236 P.2d 970, 976-77 (1951) (un-
constitutional to require a producer of natural gas to have another connect with its
lines); State v. A/S Nye Kristianborg, 8 F. Supp. 775, 780 (D. Md. 1949) (unconstitu-
tional to require owner of vessel to pay for wrongful act done by another); and Eg-
gemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 554 S.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Tex. 1977) (unconstitutional to take
separate property of husband and transfer it to wife).
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E. Application of the Joint and Several Liability Rule to
Insolvent, Partially Solvent and Immune Tortfeasors
As previously discussed, it is difficult to see why the burden of
paying a judgment attributable to the actions of one should, by
the rule of joint and several liability, be transfered to another by
virtue of his status as a "defendant." The problem is not limited
to insolvent tortfeasors. Were the plaintiff to be injured by a per-
son driving an automobile having only minimum insurance cover-
age, e.g., $15,000, and that person were to be without any
additional assets, the plaintiff could recover only $15,000. Simi-
larly, in an action involving a person over whom the plaintiff can-
not obtain jurisdiction, he is precluded from any recovery.
Finally, certain rules of law establish limits of liability which pre-
clude a plaintiff from obtaining more than a fixed amount.66 All
are subject to the rule of joint and several liability.
In respect to the limitation of liability arising under the Work-
ers' Compensation statutes, the court specifically noted that the
employer's liability would be limited to the amount paid as Work-
ers' Compensation benefits.67 Accordingly, any defendant joined
with an employer is precluded from obtaining a contribution to
the judgment in excess of the employer's obligation under the
Workers' Compensation statutes.6
Outside of California, such limiting legislation has been de-
clared unconstitutional by one court as a denial of equal protec-
tion to the co-defendant.69 On the other hand, certain cases have
indicated that proportional allocation should be made of the em-
ployer's responsibility for an incident and that an allocated per-
centage should be deducted from the plaintiff's judgment.
Otherwise, a comprehensive system of comparative negligence
would be upset by the mere addition of a third party.70 Some ju-
66. See, e.g. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3333.1, 3333.2 (West Supp. 1978) (medical mal-
practice); Waters v. Pacific Telephone Co., 12 Cal. 3d 1, 523 P.2d 1161, 114 Cal. Rptr.
753 (1974) (telephone company tariff as a limit upon liability); Duke Power Com-
pany v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978) ($560 million
limitation on liability for nuclear plants held to be constitutional).
67. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 607 n.9, 578
P.2d 899, 917, n.9, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 200 n.9 (1978).
68. Arbaugh v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co., 80 Cal. App. 3d 500, 508-
09, 145 Cal. Rptr. 608, 614-15 (1978).
69. Sunspan Eng. & Const. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffolding Co., 310 So. 2d 4 (Fla.
1975).
70. Connar v. West Shore Equipment of Milwaukie, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 42, 227
N.W.2d 660 (1975). The negligence of all parties must be considered even if they
risdictions have ignored such a statute on the basis that the plain-
tiff has not sought recompense in excess of Workers'
Compensation, holding that it is only because of an indemnity ac-
tion that the employer may be compelled to pay more.7 1
In such cases, the policy question is the same as that posed in
respect to insolvent tortfeasors: Should the employee be bound
by his settlement with his employer under the Workers' Compen-
sation Act or alternatively, should the third party defendant be
compelled to pay for the employer's negligence on the basis of
joint and several liability. The law, having placed a limit upon the
responsibility of one defendant will call upon the other defendant
to pay.
The problem of the immune or insolvent tortfeasor raises diffi-
cult problems of application. A pre-Li California case, for exam-
ple, indicated in a nuisance action that a portion of the plaintiff's
property damage to shoreline property resulted from the inevita-
ble action of the waves. Accordingly, in entering a several judg-
ment, the plaintiff received no recovery for that portion of his
damage. That result should still obtain after Li.72
In respect to insolvency (or similar problems), consistent with
the Supreme Court's enunciation of policy in American
Motorcycle, the burden should be placed upon the remaining tort-
feasors in the proportions of their respective responsibilities (ex-
cluding any settlements). For example, assume the following hy-
pothetical in which the jury concludes the total damages
amounted to $100,000:
Plaintiff (10%) Defendant 1 (30%)
Defendant 2 (20%)
Defendant 3 (25%)
Defendant 4 (15%)
Assuming Defendant 4 had settled out of the case for $10,000 prior
to verdict, the remaining defendants are responsible for paying
$80,000, i.e., the total judgment less the percentage attributable to
plaintiff (ten percent) and the amount paid in settlement
($10,000). Further, assuming Defendant 3 is insolvent, the remain-
ing defendants will be called upon to divide the unpaid amounts
in their respective allocated shares (3:2).73 In short, Defendant 1
are not a party to the action. The court found reversible error when fault was not
apportioned to a negligent employer. Payne v. Bilco Co., 54 Wis. 2d 245, 195 N.W.2d
641 (1972). Fault is apportioned to non-party defendants who have settled with the
plaintiff. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corporation, 257 N.W.2d 679 (Minn. 1977).
71. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 6-7,
374 N.E.2d 437, 442-43 (1978).
72. Katenkamp v. Union Realty Co., 36 Cal. App. 2d 602, 98 P.2d 239 (1940).
73. For the mathematically interested, the litigating solvent defendants will be
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will be compelled to pay $54,000 and Defendant 2 to pay $36,000Y.4
Each will, in this hypothetical, pay almost twice as much as his
allocable responsibility for the incident.7 5
IV. SETrLEMENT PROCEDURES
A. The Judicial and Legislative Background
The court, in its opinion, expressed the policy objective of en-
couraging settlement, and selected a particular method which
compels the settling party to buy his peace for a dollar payment,
holding.
[T]o preserve the incentive to settle which section 877 [of the Code of
Civil Procedure] provides to injured plaintiffs, we conclude that a plain-
tiff's recovery from nonsettling tortfeasors should be diminished only by
the amount that the plaintiff has actually recovered in a good faith settle-
ment, rather than by an amount measured by the settling tortfeasor's pro-
portionate responsibility for the injury.7 6
Moreover, the court indicated that such a settlement by a plaintiff
with a defendant or a cross-defendant would immunize the set-
tling defendant against claims for any further contribution or in-
demnification. The court noted that:
[W]hile we recognize that section 877, by its terms, releases a settling
tortfeasor only from liability for contribution and not partial indemnity,
we conclude that from a realistic perspective the legislative policy under-
lying the provision dictates that a tortfeasor who is entered into a 'good
faith' settlement . . . with the plaintiff must also be discharged from any
claim for partial or comparative indemnity that may be pressed by a con-
current tortfeasor.
77
The court indicated that such settlements were intended to pro-
tect the plaintiff by assuring him of total compensation. In doing
so, the court rejected the allocation principle at the heart of Li
that liability will be determined in accordance with fault. It re-
quires no great sophistication to realize that the payment of a dol-
lar amount will rarely, if ever, conform to the settling defendant's
percentage of responsibility as allocated by the jury.
called upon to pay, respectively 3/5 and 2/5 of the amount. Defendant I must pay
$30,000 + 3/5 ($25,000) + 3/5 ($15,000-$10,000) = $54,000. Defendant 2 must pay
$20,000 + 2/5 ($25,000) + 2/5 ($5,000) = $36,000.
74. Settlements made in good faith are, of course, binding upon the litigating
defendants. See text at notes 79-82 infra.
75. The examples and solution are based upon a similar, complicated pre-Li
decision, Judson v. People's Bank & Trust Company of Westfield, 17 N.J. 67, 110
A.2d 24 (1954).
76. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 604, 578 P.2d
899, 916, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 199 (1978) (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198 (citations omitted).
Although the court approved the use of a fixed dollar amount in
settlement of a potential verdict, which will be expressed as a
percentage of responsibility, it failed to approve an alternative
method.8 The latter method has generally been utilized outside
of California. It permits settlement upon the basis of the percent-
age as ultimately determined by the jury. As discussed below,
the failure to approve such an alternative procedure may cause
needless litigation over issues which could have been resolved by
the use of a few additional words in the release.
Initially, it must be recognized that litigants settle claims for a
wide variety of reasons. Inevitably, these reasons are translated
into the payment of a fixed dollar amount. Such reasons may in-
clude the assessment by each settling party of its probability of
prevailing on the merits. They may also include the more mun-
dane, but vital issues revolving about the credibility of individual
lay witnesses, expert witnesses and the vigor and ability of oppos-
ing counsel. Extrinsic considerations may have an impact. For
example, the plaintiff, for the purpose of financing his lawsuit
against the remaining defendants, may discount his claim, or the
defendant, in order to obtain a bank loan, may pay a premium to
dispose of a claim. Utilization of the only procedure approved by
the court enables a plaintiff to receive a fixed dollar amount and
additional benefits, some of which have been outlined above.
In relying solely upon the "good faith" provisions of the Califor-
nia Contribution Statute, the court may have unfortunately aided
the proliferation of litigation. One suggested procedure, as de-
scribed below, would assure that settlements would be in good
faith as a matter of law. All settlements, as the court recognized,
must be in good faith since the legislature has voided collusive
settlements favoring one of several defendants. 79
In every action, the good faith of the plaintiff and his counsel is
a question of fact.8 0 Moreover "[t]he price of a settlement is the
prime badge of its good or bad faith."81 Under the procedure set
forth in American Motorcycle, that price will be expressed solely
in dollar terms.
In settling an action, the plaintiff's obligation of good faith re-
78. Id. at 609, 578 P.2d at 919 n.1, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 202 n.1.
79. CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE §877 (West Supp. 1978); River Garden Farms v. Su-
perior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503 (1972); Laureau v.
Southern Pac. Transportation Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 798, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837, 846
(1975).
80. River Garden Farms v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 1001, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 498, 508-09 (1972); Laureau v. Southern Pac. Transportation Co., 44 Cal. App.
783, 798, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837, 846 (1975).
81. River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 996, 103
Cal. Rptr. 498, 505 (1972).
[Vol. 6:1, 1978] Allocation of Responsibility
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
quires him to consider and eliminate any form of unfair dealing
against the litigating defendants. The courts have encompassed
the good faith of the settling plaintiff within well recognized and
accepted principles stating:
An analogous problem [to that of the good faith settlement by plaintiff]
exists when an insurance carrier is called upon to exercise good faith in
accepting or rejecting an offer to settle within the limits of its policy. The
carrier's duty of good faith extends beyond fraud or dishonesty and en-
compasses any kind of unfair dealing ... In the decisions involving
wrongful refusal to settle, price is the immediate signal for the inquiry
into good faith, but only one of the many factors influencing the finding.
8 2
A settlement on the basis of plaintiff's release of the settling
tortfeasor's negligence, as subsequently allocated, would be a
good faith settlement as a matter of law.
By their nature, special verdicts or jury interrogatories assist
judicial review of settlements, as a simple example will illustrate.
The jury may determine responsibility to be as follows:
Plaintiff (10%) Defendant 1 (25%)
Defendant 2 (10%)
Defendant 3 (55%)
Assume Defendant 1 has settled by paying $10,000 and the jury af-
ter allocating responsibility, concludes that total damages are
$100,000. The resulting inference to be drawn by the litigating de-
fendants (Defendants 2 and 3) is that there was a bad faith settle-
ment.
Plaintiff will be subject to suit in the hypothetical settlement
since a primafacie case of bad faith has been presented. The set-
tlement, of course, may be subsequently subject to explanation
based upon factors intrinsic to the process of negotiating which
do not involve unfair dealing. The point is, of course, that the sys-
tem should discourage such reexamination of settlements and en-
courage the finality of settlements once made. The waste of time
and money to a plaintiff is unnecessary even if he is later found to
have negotiated in good faith. Moreover, there is an additional
lawsuit added to the trial courts' ever burgeoning civil calendar.
The prospect of such litigation will necessarily dampen the inter-
est of many plaintiffs in settling on a partial basis, even if other-
wise disposed to do so.
In New York, the courts, while approving comparative
indemnification, failed to permit percentage settlements after
82. Id. at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506 (citations omitted).
Dole v. Dow Chemical Company.8 3 Furthermore, New York has
permitted non-settling tortfeasors to sue the settling party for in-
sufficient contribution. Only two years after Dole, the New York
Legislature was required to amend the statute governing contri-
bution in order to approve settlements "in the amount of the re-
leased tortfeasor's equitable share of the damages." 84 The New
York experience of dampening settlements need not be repeated
in California. Implementation of a system which permits the set-
tling defendant to be relieved of any further problems on the ba-
sis of the plaintiff's release of an allocable percentage is simple.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the following language
sufficient to accomplish this result:
[T] he plaintiff does hereby release and discharge, the fraction and portion
and percentage of his total causes of action and claim for damages against
all parties ... which shall hereafter, by further trial or other disposition
of this or any other action be determined to be the sum of the portions or
fractions or percentages of causal negligence for which any or all of the
settling parties hereto are found to be liable .... 85
Such a procedure is fair and should eliminate, as a matter of law,
the potentially disruptive and expensive inquiry into the plain-
tiff's good faith. Such an allocable settlement system has been
legislatively or judicially adopted by numerous other comparative
negligence jurisdictions. 86
California adopted its contribution statute generally following
the New York model; there were only three amendments to it.87
Although related to the 1939 and 1955 drafts of the Uniform Con-
tribution Among the Joint Tortfeasors Act proposed by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners, California legislation does
not copy either version.88 The suggested solution of approving al-
locable settlements appears consistent with the express language
and intent of the statute. Section 877(a) of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure permits a release to "reduce the claims against the others
83. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
84. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw §15-108 (McKinney 1978).
85. Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 184-85, 124 N.W.2d 106, 108 (1963). The
settling defendants are not required to remain as parties. "[TIhe release should
be given immediate effect ... and the judgment, if any, against the nonsettling de-
fendant should only be for that percentage of negligence allocated to him by the
findings or the verdict." Id. at 193, 124 N.W.2d at 112.
86. Nebben v. Komalski, 307 Minn. 211, 213 n.1, 239 N.W.2d 234, 236 n.1 (1976);
Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 1967); TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art.
2212a, §2(e) (Vernon Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-40 (1977); Wyo. STAT. §
1-7.6 (1975 Supp.); R.I. GEN. LAws §10-6-8 (1969); MASS. ANN. LAws. ch. 231B, §4
(West Supp. 1978-1979); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §15-8-18 (1967); HAw. REV. STAT.
§§ 663-14, 66315 (1968); Rogers v. Spady, 147 N.J. Super 274, 277-78, 371 A.2d 285,
287-88 (1977).
87. JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 128-30 app. (Cal. 1957).
88. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEAsORs ACT (1939), as amended by
UNIFORM CONTRmUrIoN AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT (1955).
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[i.e. defendants] in the amount stipulated by the release."89 The
term "amount" is not defined in the statute. It can be read as in-
cluding a release of the percentage amount of responsibility at-
tributable to the settling tortfeasor's actions, with the exact
percentage being later determined by the jury. This suggested in-
terpretation would provide a finality to the settlement process, eq-
uity to the settling parties, and would discourage the preparation
of collusive settlements. This solution would, therefore, imple-
ment those objectives sought by the legislature in enacting the
statute.
First, the legislature sought to encourage finality by providing
in section 877(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure that: "It [i.e. the
release] shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from
all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasors."90 By
adopting section 4(b) of the 1955 Uniform Act in this respect, the
legislature rejected the lack of finality which had been the source
of unfavorable comment in respect to the 1939 Uniform Act.91 The
suggested interpretation would insure such finality in settle-
ments.
Second, the legislative aim was to provide an equitable alloca-
tion. As discussed above, section 875(b) provides: "Such right of
contribution shall be administered in accordance with the princi-
ples of equity."92 In adopting this provision, the legislature
promulgated the principle of section 2(4) of the 1939 Uniform Act
which had provided that: "When there is such a disproportion of
fault among tortfeasors as to render inequitable an equal distribu-
tion among them of the common liability by contribution, the rela-
tive degrees of fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in
determining their pro rata shares."93 Necessarily, the legislature
rejected the 1955 version in which the code commissioners had in-
dicated that "relative degrees of fault shall not be considered."94
That rejection of comparative negligence was explained by the
commissioners as follows: "This section in positive terms resolves
several difficult questions of policy. First, it recognizes and regis-
ters the lack of need for a comparative negligence or degrees of
89. CAL. CIV. Paoc. CODE §877(a) (West Supp. 1978).
90. Id. §877(b) (West Supp. 1978).
91. UNIFORM CoNTRIBUrTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §4(b) (1955). See Pros-
ser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MIcH. L. REV. 465, 506 (1953).
92. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE §875(b) (West Supp. 1978).
93. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §2(4) (1939).
94. UNIFORM CoNRIuTIoN AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §2 (1955).
fault rule in contribution cases."95 The suggested procedure ex-
pressly recognizes that the settlement would be based upon allo-
cable percentage; as recognized by the court in American
Motorcycle, an allocable percentage is an equitable distribution of
responsibility.
Finally, the court sought to preclude collusion in settlements by
requiring that they be in good faith, a principle adopted by the
1955 draft act.96 In this respect, section 877 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not
to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or
judgment to one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable
for the same tort-
(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability un-
less its terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others
in the amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or
in the amount of the consideration paid for it whichever is the
greater .... 97
The emphasized portion is the element focused upon in the dis-
cussion above and by the court in American Motorcycle. The sug-
gested procedure must be in good faith since the plaintiff cannot
attempt to secure that loss percentage from the litigating defend-
ants.
B. Sliding Scale Recovery Agreements (Mary Carter
Agreements)
By an order of modification, filed March 6, 1978, the cojurt modi-
fied the list of statutory provisions affected by its discussion of
contribution and comparative indemnification. 98 The Sliding
Scale Agreement or as it is more popularly known, the Mary
Carter Agreement, is a variant of the normal release or covenant
not to sue. The term is derived from the comment by the Florida
Appellate Court in Maule Industries v. Roundtree,99 which stated:
The term arises from the agreement popularized by the case of Booth v.
Mary Carter Paint Co., [citation omitted] and now appears to be used
rather generally to apply to an agreement between the plaintiff and some
(but less than all) defendants whereby the parties place limitations on the
financial responsibility of the agreeing defendants, the amount of which is
variable and usually in some inverse ratio to the amount of recovery
95. Id. Comm'r Note.
96. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 604, 578 P.2d
899, 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 198-99 (1978).
97. CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE §877 (West Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
98. The Court modified its opinion by an addition to footnote 5. Justice Clark
in his dissent added two additional footnotes (footnotes 1 and 2). These footnotes
are incorporated in the Pacific and California Reporters.
The modification to footnote 5 makes it clear that CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §877.5
(West Supp. 1978), concerning sliding scale recovery agreements, does not pre-
clude the court from establishing equitable implied indemnity.
99. 264 So.2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) rev'd 284 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1973).
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which the plaintiff is able to- make against the nonagreeing defendant or
defendants. 10 0
The Mary Carter Agreement creates even more substantial diffi-
culties in ascertaining good faith than the agreements outlined
above.
In a Mary Carter Agreement, the objective of the settling de-
fendant is to assist the plaintiff to increase the size of the total
judgment. The relation between settlement price and percentage
allocation is more difficult to determine than the typical settle-
ment. The settling defendant usually remains in the litigation to
assist the plaintiff in prosecuting his action. Accordingly, it ap-
pears that the greater the success of the defendant in increasing
the amount of the verdict, the more likely it is that there will be
an attack upon the settlement by the litigating defendants, partic-
ularly in view of the settling defendant's decreasing share of the
total judgment as the judgment increases in size.
The Mary Carter Agreement establishes, almost by its defini-
tion, an irreconcilable tension between the two major elements
comprising the test of good faith: (1) the price paid by the settling
defendant and (2) the calculated dollar value of that defendant's
responsibility as determined by the jury at the time of trial. Se-
crecy has been the key element in such agreements. The 1977 leg-
islative revisions to the settlement and contribution provisions
indicate that such agreements are legal.101
The legislature, in its amendment, has established a remedy for
the litigating defendant in the form of disclosure to the trier of
fact of the existence and the essential terms of the agreement. In
relevant part, section 877.5(2) provides:
If the action is tried before a jury, and a defendant party to the agree-
ment is a witness, the court shall, upon motion of a party, disclose to the
jury the existence and content of the agreement or covenant, unless the
court finds that such disclosure will create substantial danger 'of undue
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.
The jury disclosure herein required shall be no more than necessary to
be sure the jury understands (1) the essential nature of the agreement,
but not including the amount paid, or any contingency, and (2) the possi-
bility that the agreement may bias the testimony of the alleged tortfeasor
or tortfeasors who entered into the agreement.
10 2
The impact of revealing to the jury that one of the parties (1) has
settled, but is continuing to litigate the matter, and (2) has agreed
100. Id. 264 So.2d at 446 n.1.
101. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE §§877.5 et. seq. (West Supp. 1978).
102. Id. §877.5(a) (2) (West Supp. 1978).
to help the plaintiff, is intended to benefit the litigating defendant.
In the context of allocating responsibility to the settling defend-
ant, it may well lead to an increase in the proportion of responsi-
bility allocated to that party who is now a "pseudo" plaintiff.
Within the framework of good faith, it seems inevitable that
such settlements will be attacked as being in bad faith. Absent
special circumstances, the attack should be successful.
V. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the impact of American Motorcycle
Association upon the law of torts; it has significantly revised sub-
stantive and procedural law in the State of California. The basic
holdings will become the predicate of numerous other related de-
cisions. Similarly, the philosophical tenets underlying the deci-
sion will continue to affect and guide California tort law for many
years to come.
